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The Regulatory Review
March 25, 2019
The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals
Herbert Hovenkamp
Senator Warren’s proposals seek to protect older technologies at the
expense of consumers and workers.
Antitrust policy promises to be an important issue in the 2020 presidential election, and for
good reason. Market power as measured by price-cost margins has been on the rise since
the 1980s. Unreasonably high margins reduce output, causing higher prices for consumers
and fewer jobs for labor.
Responding to concern about increasing market power, presidential candidate U.S.
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has recently offered two proposals directed at large
tech platforms.
One proposal would designate large platform-based companies such as Amazon as
“platform utilities” and prohibit them from selling their own merchandise on the platform
in competition with other sellers. This “structural separation” rule would apply to
platforms that exceed $25 billion in annual revenue, including Amazon, Google, and
Facebook. Smaller platforms would not be required to separate structurally but would
be placed under a standard of “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing” with thirdparty merchants. These rules could be enforced by both government agencies and private
parties.
Senator Warren’s second proposal would reverse “illegal and anti-competitive tech
mergers,” focusing on large platform acquisitions of smaller firms. Her
statement identifies Amazon and Whole Foods as such a merger, as well as
Facebook’s acquisition of messaging company WhatsApp.
Both Warren proposals express concerns about privacy as well as competition. The
proposals are populist and resemble, in two respects, the approach taken by the Trump
Administration on climate change. First, the Warren proposals largely ignore the
mainstream understanding of the problem. Second, although the proposals sound simple,
they mask complex issues and are likely to produce unintended results. Structural antitrust
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remedies are easy to articulate and they have been a feature of heavy-handed antitrust
policy since the early twentieth century. For example, a 1912 antitrust decree broke the
Standard Oil monopoly into 34 smaller firms. But a few years later, the Federal Trade
Commission was obliged to issue a report explaining why gasoline prices rose so
dramatically after the breakup.
Why would a Warren Administration focus on large tech platforms? Although monopoly is
a serious problem and margins have grown rapidly since the 1980s, the increases have
mainly occurred in markets for manufactured products (such as cars), breakfast cereal,
steel, airlines, household goods (such as batteries), and beer. By contrast, most of Google’s
products are sold at a price of zero to consumers, although businesses pay for advertising.
Amazon has very low margins in comparison to other retailers. Furthermore, the firms that
the Warren proposal targets have high consumer satisfaction ratings and some of them,
such as Amazon, have exhibited significant growth at the expense of traditional brick-andmortar retail.
Senator Warren’s proposal is thus similar to the Trump Administration’s strategy of
protecting coal at the expense of sustainable energy sources. Both strategies favor older
technologies in danger of being displaced—fossil fuel companies in the case of the Trump
Administration and traditional retail firms in the Warren proposal.
Who gains from Senator Warren’s first proposal to keep large platform companies from
selling their own merchandise? Not consumers or labor, both of whom benefit from high
output and low prices. Indeed, the text of the Warren proposal is largely indifferent to
output or pricing—and may even lead to lower output and higher prices. The statement
outlining the proposal justifies its prohibition by citing Progressive Era rules that required
structural separation of public utilities from ordinary businesses. But utilities at that time,
including railroads, were subject to price regulation. A price-regulated utility’s expansion
into unregulated markets—for instance, when railroads acquired coal mines or hotels—
created opportunities for manipulating the costs of its regulated business. By contrast, if it
is not subject to price regulation, a company’s “vertical” integration of inputs and outputs
can be good for competition. For example, oil refiners also sell gasoline in order to prevent
price fixing by independent gasoline stations.
Firms also vertically integrate their distribution in order to eliminate price premiums that
result from trademarks or entrenched brands. One very popular example is
“AmazonBasics” house brand of consumer batteries, which are just as good as but much
cheaper than branded batteries such as Energizer or Duracell. Energizer is owned by a
holding company which also makes Rayovac and Eveready. Duracell is owned by
Berkshire-Hathaway. Both are large publicly-traded firms with high price-cost margins.
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House brands such as AmazonBasics allow customers to avoid paying high prices for the
trademarks of other large companies. And when house brands are sold in competition with
branded goods, as they are on Amazon, they also force name brands to cut their own prices.
But under Senator Warren’s proposal, Amazon could no longer sell AmazonBasics batteries
in competition with these brands. The proposal faults house brands for copying the goods
of others. To be sure, intellectual property laws are not always effective at preventing
copying. Nevertheless, making a cheaper generic copy of another firm’s trademarked brand
is not any kind of theft at all. Rather, it serves consumers by giving them the opportunity to
avoid paying for a trademark or name that they do not want. The result is less monopoly,
not more.
Senator Warren’s proposed exception for smaller platforms—allowing them to market
both their goods and those of competitors—misunderstands the relationship between
company size and market power. Amazon is a very large platform, but that is because it
reportedly sells more than three billion products worldwide. For most individual products,
Amazon’s market share is small. A more specialized vendor that sells only, say, computer
printers might have much lower overall sales volume but a much larger footprint in that
product—and consequently, greater market power. The distinction Senator Warren’s
proposal makes based merely on company size makes no sense unless it is tied to a
particular share of a product.
Senator Warren’s second proposal, which would keep large platforms from acquiring
smaller firms, identifies a serious problem: large platforms are undertaking numerous
acquisitions of smaller companies, some of which are or could become competitors. The
problem is severe because predicting anticompetitive effects in individual cases is so
difficult. On the one hand, such mergers can be procompetitive if they enable a large firm
to improve its product offerings. On the other hand, small acquired firms might develop in
the future into important competitors, but their acquisition prevents this from happening.
One promising remedy to this problem is to limit larger companies’ technology acquisitions
to nonexclusive licenses. That way, the firm can obtain any technology that the smaller firm
has to offer, but it cannot acquire the right to exclude rivals from using the technology.
The Warren proposal, however, does not do this. Instead, it disapproves of mergers such as
the one between Amazon and Whole Foods, which almost certainly benefit both consumers
and labor. The Amazon-Whole Foods merger places rival grocery chains under pressure to
innovate. For example, Walmart is now expanding its offerings to include delivery and
other services.
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Any time a merger or other practice reduces a firm’s costs or improves its products or
services, it boosts competition by putting pressure on obsolete or less efficient rivals. But
protecting these rivals should not be the purpose of the antitrust laws. Rather, the focus of
antitrust laws should be on maximizing output, which benefits both consumers and
workers.
In that respect, the Warren proposals are also notable for what they do not say. One stark
deficiency is the lack of concern about high consumer prices, even though Senator
Warren madeher career promoting the protection of consumers. Nevertheless, her
proposal ignores them and is more concerned about protecting inefficient, higher cost
competitors.
Another problem is the lack of any concern about labor, whose wages have not come close
to keeping pace with corporate earnings. Rather than looking out for competitors, antitrust
policy should encourage maximum output, which helps both consumers and labor by
providing more opportunities for jobs. If policymakers are truly concerned about workers,
then they should urge that anticompetitive practices in labor markets receive greater
attention from antitrust enforcers.
Not only are consumers and labor two of the Democratic Party’s most important and
vulnerable constituencies, their protection is what should be driving antitrust policy for
both parties.
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